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attitude and experience those two motives which have seemed to so many to be utterly incompatible with one another, the motives of possession and activity, contemplation and control, idealism and democracy, the idea systems of Platonism and Christianity, and the moving ideals of the modern age. And I have wished to urge that, in principle, these two attitudes are not necessarily antagonistic, but that they mutually imply and reinforce each other when we take them at their fullest and their best" (p. 239). No one will doubt that it is along these lines that idealism must be maintained and defended. I am not quite sure, however, that Professor Adams has succeeded in showing that the natural and the ideal "imply and reinforce each other." It is not enough to point out that as a matter of fact they do so in Religion, if this term is used to denote some special and isolated realm of experience. The appeal to Religion is warranted only if this attitude can be shown to be implicit in all experience and to be nothing but the most complete expression of what all experience implies. In spite of passages like the one just quoted, I cannot help finding in the book an attempt to defend an idealism of the dualistic type. I cannot now fully justify this statement: but I would refer to the adoption of Bergson's view of the relation of the brain as an instrument of action and the life of the mind as pure memory or knowledge (p. 171), and also to the arguments in support of the autonomy of values, as a realm having its justification and authority in itself. It seems to me that there is a truer and more courageous type of idealism which does not proceed by antitheses, but assumes as its guiding principle the identity of the real and the rational.

Notwithstanding these criticisms, which may to some extent be due to my failure to understand the author, the book is full of suggestion and value. It seems to me a genuine contribution to our understanding of our own age and of the forces which have produced it.

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Strife of Systems and Productive Duality. An Essay in Philosophy.

By WILMON HENRY SHELDON. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1918.—pp. 528 and index.

This closely knit volume of over five hundred pages is undoubtedly a distinct achievement. Whether its merit may not lie in some quarter other than where the author supposes it to lie, or where he would most wish it to lie, is another matter. The volume offers an admirably sympathetic and—certainly for the most part—accurate cross section of the deposit of the entire philosophic tradition. If the

author's own solution of the radical philosophical problem is not satisfactory, if his philosophy does not provide an actual map of the world and yield a body of doctrine which may guide human conduct—which is what he aims to do—at any rate his study does furnish a very tolerable map of the world of philosophical issues and solutions.

There is here no slightest yielding of the old unabashed metaphysical boldness. Philosophy undertakes actually to explain the entire content of the world. It seeks a formula which shall be utterly comprehensive, fertile, inclusive of all more partial insights, and productive of the concrete and individual detail of things. It requires courage thus to envisage the task of philosophy. And Professor Sheldon brings to this high task catholicity of interest, power of analysis, and an historical imagination sufficient to make the book worth while, even though our final judgment must be that his own solution is formal and barren.

The plan of the work runs somewhat as follows: There is a radical philosophic disease which brings it about that, in philosophy, there is no cumulative, funded truth. The problem is to discover the poison which has made for exclusiveness, disagreement and mutual contradictions. The author will seek a solution through an examination of the chief recurrent types of philosophical systems, trying to discover the source of the difficulty, and then to remove it.

There are thus passed in review the major systems of philosophy. They fall into two main groups, "partisan" types, and "synthetic" types. A partisan type results from the attempt to draw a complete map of the entire world from the point of view of a single angle or concept: "Subject, object, individual, universal, static, dynamic, mind, matter, biological adjustment, pure theory, will, reason, feeling." The synthetic type results from a conscious attempt to harmonize the conflicting partial types, and "to heal the philosophic disease by the device of breadth or all-inclusiveness" (p. 317). There are three such synthetic types: the Hegelian or logical, the Leibnizian or æsthetic, and the Thomistic-Aristotelian, or practical type.

But, so the argument runs, each of these historic types, partial or synthetic, falls a prey to essentially the same radical disease. There is for each system a "critical point." It is not that a system is true up to its critical point, and false beyond that point. It is true *throughout*. But beyond its critical point it is unprofitable and infertile. Thus, for Subjectivism there is the mental and the objective. Now it is perfectly true that anything objective *can*, if you will, be defined in mental terms, but mental categories alone can never account either

for the existence or for the detail of that which is objective. "The objective side of reality is the critical point of subjectivism" (p. 66). Likewise the individual is the critical point of all Platonisms. "Everything about an individual can be defined in terms of universals; . . . The paint of universality can be daubed over everything—as was the case with subjectivity too" (p. 235). But no universal will ever account for an individual. And so for each of the historic types of philosophy.

Through generalizing this situation we may reach a diagnosis of the disease. The strife here in question turns out to be, at bottom, the conflict between the externality and the internality of relations, between sameness and difference. Each system starts with some one category which it supposes to be self-contained and ultimate (externality), and then sets out to interpret all else in terms of that category (internality). It is "as if each category said to its counterpart, I am ultimate and you are not, for you are only a relation in me" (p. 417). The author's solution lies in holding that sameness and difference do not exclude each other. They are *other*, but not opposite. And it is their very duality which is productive of all novelty and of all reality. Here is the author's own account of his formula in its most rudimentary and abstract shape: "Suppose the simplest possible dyad: any two things which possess both sameness and difference. Call them *A* and *B*. Then *B*, being the same as *A*, must have the relation to *B* which *A* has, to wit, difference. *B* is therefore different from *B*. (This does not destroy the identity of *B*, as sameness and difference are not mutually destructive.) This second *B* should be called by a new name, to distinguish it from the first, viz., *C*. Now *C*, being the same with *B*, must be, as *B* is, different from itself—hence is implied a new entity *D*. This series is indefinitely long" (p. 509).

This is the formula of "productive duality" which is to unlock the secrets of the universe. It is to succeed where all previous synthetic philosophies have failed, *i.e.*, in showing how "one fact or event, one part of the universe, leads on to another." "It has shown—even though to a very limited extent thus far—a fertility which no other principle yet named has been able to claim" (p. 498). The author's concrete applications of his principle—from the iceberg floating on the sea to the problems of society and morality—are interesting and acute. Yet, notwithstanding many pertinent analogies and careful analyses, the impression of barren formality, of a too optimistic confidence in the fertility of a comprehensive formula, of a desire to see everything as but the unrolling of a single and ultimate process,

such an impression will not depart from the reader's mind. Such an interest and such a temper hardly conduce now to a valid understanding of the problems of our present social structure. To be sure, this present volume is concerned mainly with the elucidation of the formula, not with its concrete applications. It may be that the further exploration of the practical insight afforded by the concept of productive duality, which the author promises, will do much to mitigate this impression of dialectic futility and abstractness.

This partially negative judgment should not, however, be the last word. It is a very substantial and much needed achievement to have given the careful exposition of Natorp's, Münsterberg's, and Baldwin's systems, to have given a fine portrayal and interpretation of the Thomistic synthesis, to have subjected "Great Objectivism" to a remarkably clear and acute analysis and criticism, and everywhere, to see into the motives, the difficulties, and the deeper points of contact between the major types of philosophic thinking. This value remains whatever be the worth of the author's own ingenious system and solution.

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The Origin and Evolution of Life. By HENRY FAIRFIELD OSBORN. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1917.—pp. xxi, 322.

This book furnishes a remarkable survey of evolution from the precellular stage of the bacteria and their forerunners to the higher mammals. It is as remarkable for its contribution to scientific hypothesis as for its mastery of data. It shows the distance, in both respects, that biological science has traveled since Darwin. It begins with the chemical analysis of life and describes the inorganic preparation for life in our solar system and on our planet. On the latter point the author is in substantial agreement with Professor Lawrence J. Henderson. Against a background of "perhaps a hundred million years" the author arranges the available material, particularly the paleontological evidence to which he is a distinguished contributor, into a wonderful story which gives the reader the impression of a great epic, more fascinating to us today than the mythology of *Paradise Lost*. It gives us indeed an appreciation of the poetry of science, at the same time that it shows that "imagination itself is strictly limited to recombinations of ideas which have come through observation," and that any theory to be of value must rest upon "experiment, observation and research, guided by imagination and checked by verification." Throughout, the author manifests a candor